Karl Dönitz: War Criminal and committed Nazi follower?

This research project will hope to achieve a greater understanding behind the complexity of Karl Dönitz while referring to primary and secondary documentations. Firstly, this essay will investigate with Dönitz contribution as a naval commander and his involvement with the Flensburg Government as President of Germany. Moreover, we will consider some of the arguments for Hitler’s appointment of Dönitz as head of state and also outline some controversial statements and claims made by Hitler’s successor pre-1945 concerning his anti-Semitic and apolitical agenda. We will put forward a number of reasons why Dönitz was indicted under the International Military Tribunal for crimes against peace and war crimes. An extensive amount of primary source evidence relating to Dönitz’s can be located from his memoirs and personal writings. While reviewing the works of Dönitz ‘Ten Years and Twenty Days’, Mein Wechelsvollves Leben and Deutsche Strategie zur See im Zweiten Weltkrieg, I was introduced to the notion that Dönitz’s work and statements are completely up to interpretation. Finding information on Dönitz relationship to anti-Semitism post-war is virtually not existent but pre-1945 statements regarding anti-Semitic hate is visible. He discusses his naval career and being the sole representative to a crumbling Third Reich. Reports offer the greatest insight to his connection with the Nazism and to what extent his contribution impacted the final days of the war. We will also investigate the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and discuss the hypocrisy and unfair treatment displayed towards Admiral Dönitz as Head of State during the judiciary process.

Particular insight into the impact of indictments brought against Dönitz in the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg is offered via descriptive records and statements given by Dönitz, Kranzbühler and the Allied prosecutors. These records include the dates, decisions and reasoning for the indictments at the IMT. a valuable historical record to date, this essay intends to highlight the role Dönitz played in the Nazi Party while also investigating his apolitical agenda. Very little has been analysed and researched on Dönitz as a war criminal and devoted follower of the Nazi ideology. By investigating the works of Dönitz himself and other powerful personalities associated within Nazi Germany, primary and secondary documentation and literature from the period, we will draw conclusions from scholarly knowledge to show that Dönitz was a committed figure associated with the ideologies of Nazism and an anti-Semite.

Dönitz as Großadmiral, President of Germany and Supreme Commander of German Armed Forces

Karl Dönitz was born on the 16th September 1891 in Berlin-Grünau. He was known for his bravery serving under the Imperial German Navy where he received an Iron Cross 1st Class for his heroic acts displayed in World War I. Following the death of Adolf Hitler in April 1945, leadership of the Third Reich was passed to Karl Dönitz, who up until the succession had served as the Großadmiral to the U-Boot and submarine fleet of the Reich, the Kriegsmarine. Furthermore, he ultimately played a significant role in the naval history of World War II by developing a naval tactic known as the Rudeltatik or ‘Wolfpack’, this was commonly used in submarine warfare and comprised of mass-attacks against conveys which was implemented by German U-Boots during naval warfare. He was bestowed the honour of head of state in Hitler’s Last Will and Testament as President of Germany and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

In 1945, Adolf Hitler committed suicide in his bunker but what about the fate of the German government after his death? While Dönitz was appointed following Hitler’s death as the last Führer of Germany, his involvement in the fate of the Flensburg government is somehow overlooked. Dönitz’s appointment as head of state, played a pivotal role in the dissolution of the government and set the tone for peace to prosper throughout a war-ravaged Europe. Although Dönitz did not sign the documents of surrender himself, he was instrumental in commissioning representatives such as Keitel, Jodl and von Friedeburg to sign the surrender documents. This would order the “all forces under German control to cease active operation at 23.01 hours Central Europe Time on the 8th May 1945”. On the 23rd May 1945 after signing an armistice agreement, the Dönitz government was dissolved and subsequently arrested by the RAF Regiment. While the Flensburg Government was only in operation for a mere three weeks, the policy implemented of the unconditional German surrender and the ending of the war was a significant act undertaken by the Dönitz government. He could have easily commanded his officers to battle to the bitter end but in fact, saved the lives of many German soldiers by ordering the surrender of Nazi Germany. Whether the soldiers of the Reich would have obeyed his orders to prolong the war is doubtful due to the threat of Germany under Allied occupation with the Americans entering from the West and the Soviets from the East. His choice to not prolong the suffering of Germans and innocent civilians must be viewed as heroic act to cease the bloodshed. He assumed that Soviet troops would have intentions to enslave Germans which would have had a significant impact. Significant numbers of refugees made the journey to occupied American and British zones. German troops were imprisoned by the Soviets on the Baltic Eastern Front. Out of the 1,850,000 soldiers, 1,490,000 were captured. 55% of Wehrmacht soldiers operating from the Eastern Front and in Czechoslovakia were able to retreat due to Dönitz’s leadership by withdrawing from the American demarcation line. The trepidation concerning his fears on the potential enslavement of German civilians proved notably false, but those soldiers captured by the Soviets were harshly treated than those captured in the West, with many not surviving the captivity period they suffered. Dönitz’s ambitions to save numerous German lives by his tactics of continuation of the war succeeded. However, the alternative of this decision is open to speculation to analysis what else he could have done concerning the war effort.

The Dönitz government can be divided into pre and post-surrender activities that were fundamental to organising peace between the Germans and Allied forces. Undertakings concerning negotiations of surrender were instrumental in pre-surrender tactics which were conducted in several stages before the surrender of Germany. They intended to make a crucial decision to prolong the war in the East while pursuing to fashion peace in the West to grant the evacuation of German soldiers from East Prussia. It can be highlighted that without the intervention of the Dönitz government that the war may have continued for many Germans, resulting in an even greater number of catastrophic deaths at the hands of the Allies. However, his government can be viewed as therefore indispensable in the transition from war to peace in Europe.

Dönitz as a committed Nazi follower

Dönitz was officially not a member of the Nazi Party until receiving an honorary Gold Party Badge decoration from the Führer on 30th January1944. Despite the Großadmiral’s post-war claims his involvement as a devout Nazi is evident through his closely-tied relationship with Hitler. Many believed that Dönitz was not a war criminal and should have been acquitted from the charges that he was investigated under. Many historians debate Dönitz’s loyalty to the Führer, whether he was just following orders or was he a full-fledged Nazi. These theories can be adapted to show that he in fact admired Hitler which can be viewed through his surrender speech when addressing the German people. Dönitz above all, was a professional and must have recognised that a process of elimination had raised his status to become the successor of the Reich. He is widely remembered by historians for his naval career but his tenure as head of state was not without impact. Although it cannot be concealed that Dönitz had a significant blind spot for the murderous systematic crimes of the regime, he served devoutly to the bitter end as a loyal member of the Nazi Party and as a friend to the Führer.

Hitler’s selection of Dönitz as the successor of the Reich in his Last Will and Testament has left many historians puzzled by the choice. The extent of Dönitz’s position in the Third Reich’s governmental hierarchy is virtual unrecognised as he was not a party member until 1944, it was only subsequently at the end that Hitler chose him to be his successor. Perhaps for Hitler, Dönitz may have been loyal and committed to the Führer, while all his other officials wanted to pursue power and control. Göring was considered the obvious designated successor to Hitler and would therefore seize the control of the German Armed Forces. However, he was not chosen for reasons that we will now address. Göring’s decision to telegram Hitler requesting permission to seize power of the Reich was regarded by the Führer as an act of treason. This rash move saw Göring’s expulsion from the party and stripped of his position. Charismatic figures such as Himmler or Goebbels seemed the more obvious choices for succession, as all of these men towered above Dönitz’s position as head of the Kriegsmarine within the Nazi Party. We cannot be certain on the stability and mentality of Hitler’s mindset during the final days of the war, considering this the appointment of Dönitz could have been a prompted choice in the moment which could have been a impulsive decision due to an irrational weighted pressure imposed on Hitler. Regardless of the debated reasons for the appointment of Dönitz as head of state, it must be stated that officially control and power was seized by the leader of the Kriegsmarine. Hitler in his Last Will and Testament suggests that the provisions of a new government be established under the command of Dönitz. Dönitz startled by the appointment reflects in his memoirs, that perhaps Hitler chose him to be successor of the Reich to enable the way for an officer of the Armed Forces to put an end to the existence of the war in Europe.

Despite his post-war claims, Dönitz was a pragmatic supportive of Nazism in the years subsequently leading up to the Second World War. He underlined, he was only following orders in the greater scheme of things from his superiors and that he had no anti-Semitic beliefs to those that were presented by the Nazi ideology. It is the fluidity and complexity of Dönitz’s National Socialist devout understanding that provides a valid and insightful argument into his relationship with Nazism. His refusal to accept responsibility for the anti-Semitic ideology associated with Nazism. However, after previously having made a number of anti-Semitic statements throughout his career as a naval commander, these elements ultimately indicate Dönitz as being an anti-Semite.

Dönitz’s statements made pre-1945 certainly link him as closely tied to Hitler and the Nazi ideology. Dönitz maintained that when he entered the Reich Navy, he was serving the state and not a particular government. However, this notion of serving just the state began to transform from an apolitical agenda into perhaps more anti-Semitic notions His attitude towards the Nazi Party and their dogmas is seen through his public utterances condemning Jews. He received the title of Hitler Youth Dönitz, after addressing the Hitler Youth in an inappropriate manner. He knew the Führer was the almighty god among the ranks of the Reich and stated "In comparison to Hitler we are all pipsqueaks. Anyone who believes he can do better than the Führer is stupid”. This declaration, exhibits his overwhelming obsession with Hitler, referring that no one can outshine the authority of the Führer. He is reported to have made several antisemitic propaganda statements in 1944, where he blamed the action of Sweden closing their international waters to Germany as a cowardly action made out of trepidation and dependence on the international Jewish capital. While he disclaims his post-war claims of refusing to accept his involvement as a devout Nazi, he said ‘I would rather eat dirt than see my grandchildren grow up in the filthy, poisonous atmosphere of Jewry’. He acknowledged on German Heroes’ Day in March 1944, that without Adolf Hitler as Germany’s saviour that the country would be beset by the ‘poison of Jewry’ and therefore the destruction of National Socialism which met an uncompromising ideology with defiance. Dönitz claimed during the Nuremberg Trials that he had no prior knowledge about the extermination of Jews and nobody among his men in the navy had any involvement with violence against Jews. Leon Goldensohn, an American psychiatrist,b who was the son of Lithuanian Jews conducted several interviews with the Nazi defendants at Nuremberg. In one of his interviews, Donitz proclaimed "I never had any idea of the goings-on as far as Jews were concerned. Hitler said each man should take care of his business, and mine was U-boats and the Navy” while highlighting his support and admiration for Admiral Bernhard Rogge, who had a Jewish grandparent.

He drew upon the fact that he was a soldier and not a politician to disguise his involvement concerning political views on the fate of the European Jewry. There is a diverse collection of testimonies that give credence to the ideology of Dönitz being a committed Nazi follower. These testimonies include his defence of Hitler’s humanity in the face of condemnatory generals. One could argue that Dönitz is quite the complex personality as his acceptance of responsibility concerning his loyalty to Nazism varies in relationship regarding hatred of Jews. His position of being a naval commander allowed Dõnitz to excuse himself from the atrocities committed by the Nazi Party as he argued that his role did not permit any involvement or responsibility on his shoulders as he was not a politician. “I read sometime around 1938 of Jewish fines and some street actions against them. But I was too concerned with U-Boats and the naval problems to be concerned about Jews.” Therefore, characterising the atrocities of the Third Reich that occurred as being under the control and accountability of Nazi politicians and not soldiers. The complexity of his character can be differentiated between post and pre-1945 where perhaps his motives and loyalties change.

Dönitz as a fanatic Nazi admits he knew of concentration camps and advised in a 1944 conference, that 12,000 prisoners be employed directly in the shipyards as additional labour workers to strengthen the U-Boot fleet production. While he was a prominent naval commander, he still had no subsequent jurisdiction that oversaw shipyard construction. He argued it was merely a suggestion to potential useful production within the shipyards. While Dönitz position within the Nazism ideology is often questioned, his knowledge of the concentration camps exhibits his statutory position as a committed Nazi. While Dönitz disassociates himself with assertions of anti-Semitism and hatred of Jews, his 1944 address to the German nation on the death of the Führer highlights his loyalty to Hitler. We should affirm the question that Hitler would not have easily just appointed somehow who wasn’t a devout Nazi. Dönitz would have been chosen as successor due to his loyalty and rejection to accept the poison of the European Jewry.

In March 1944, he emphasised his anti-Semitic tendencies by stating that if Hitler had not united the German nation under National Socialism, the outcome would have therefore seen “split parties, beset with the spreading poison of Jewry… we would long since have succumbed under the burden of this war.” When asked to clarify the intentions of his worlds instrumented in this speech at the International Military Tribunal, he expressed, “I was of the opinion that the endurance, the power to endure, of the people, as it was composed, could be better preserved than if there were Jewish elements in the nation”. The evidence of this speech stresses his anti-Semitic agenda and furthermore signifies his loyalty to Hitler. While there is no evidence to support that Dönitz was involved with various Nazi racial programs, he did however remark that a soldier’s asthma endangered the Volksgemeinschaft. The importance of this comment perhaps weighs the importance of his potential approval of the Holocaust.

The significance of Dönitz’s contribution and involvement to the Nazi ideology is somewhat undermined due to an his absence at imperative war planning conferences. However, he had a notable impact on the course of war regarding his tactics and strategies implemented in terms of submarine warfare. As a remarkable naval commander his achievements for submarine warfare is evidently remembered but his tenure as head of state and contribution to the naval service are overlooked. It comes as no surprise that he was bestowed the honour by Hitler as successor. Dönitz was viewed as a devout believer and advocate to National Socialism and anti-Semite despite his post-war claims of distancing himself from all involvement and acceptance of all radical right-wing politics. Furthermore, the succession of Dönitz as the new head of state was probably the most understandable due to the displacement of Himmler and Göring. Followed by the death of Goebbels in the bunker and the decline of Bormann to appear at Flensburg or Plön also added to the reasoning behind his succession. Therefore, Jodl and Dönitz were the only laudable personalities to lead and command the German armed forces and to be sanctioned by the Wehrmacht as the new commander of the German military. Whether the choice of the succession was the preferred choice of Hitler is not certain but due to the circumstances the ideal alternative.

International Military Tribunal

After the war, Dönitz was prosecuted and charged as a major war criminal at the Nuremberg Trials on three separate counts: (1) conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity; (2) planning, initiating, and waging wars of aggression and (3) crimes against the laws of war. Dönitz opted to summon Otto Kranzbühler, a naval judge known for his clarity of thought and argument as his representative in court. Kranzbühler’s reputation added to Dönitz’s defence as his confidence in defending his naval chief was evident during the trial. He had every right to be optimistic considering the first two counts against Dönitz failed sustainably. The task to prove Dönitz was complicit in attending war planning conferences was easily proved by Kranzbühler as he could not be therefore persecuted for decisions made when not directly present.

It is somehow forgotten when discussing the IMT’s that the tribunal only tried German war criminals. In the sake of displaying fairness and justice, all war crimes whether performed by German or Allied Forces should have been comprehensively investigated and tried in court. The Nuremberg Trials can be construed as the tribunal of the victors, due to the lack of impartiality displayed. It was deemed that Hitler’s successor could not so easily escape the process without retribution. The British for the most part had concluded that the Kriegsmarine that fought a clean war. This thought was not shared by their American counterparts who believed Dönitz came too close to winning the Atlantic war to be released free without punishment.

Although Dönitz assembled and trained the German U-Boat command, the evidence in the war tribunal did not provide an understanding that he was aware of the conspiracy to wage aggressive wars or that he in any way intended or prepared to initiate such warlike actions against the Allies. As a commander of the U-Boot and naval fleet, he was therefore performing tactical duties strictly outlined to execute under orders. Regardless of his high role in the Reich he was not present at the relevant conferences that planned aggressive war and therefore no evidence is available to demonstrate that he had any knowledge of the following decisions that were determined at these conferences. Despite no prior knowledge of the decisions reached, he did ,however, wage aggressive war within the confined meaning of that word as used by the Charter. Submarine warfare which commenced upon the declaration of war in Europe, which was fully coordinated with other branches of the Reich such as the Wehrmacht. The U-Boat fleet, limited in numbers at the outbreak of war, was willing to wage war against the Allies.

Crimes Against Peace

The significance of Dönitz position of the Nazi Party is underestimated until his appointment in January 1943 as Commander-in-Chief of the German naval fleet. He was not merely just an army or division commander because the U-Boat fleet was a principal fundamental unit within the German Armed Forces and Dönitz was its leader. Throughout the early years of the war, the sea fleet made few raids, but its effectiveness of his submarines damaged many of the allied enemy boats were sunk during Dönitz tenure as a naval leader. This means of warfare was directly under the command of Dönitz who inspired the decisions and tactics devised by the naval fleet. When devising the invasion of Norway, Dönitz made recommendations in October 1939, as to submarine bases, which he therefore claimed was merely a staff study. He recommended to Hitler that 300 U-Boots be built to uplift and support the naval fleet as it was just an important strand of the German war effort as tanks were. Perhaps if Hitler had listened to his recommendation, then Germany could have potentially invaded England and subsequent countries with ease.

Dönitz’s importance concerning the German war effort cannot be overlooked, he is so well regarded as an influential leader which is proved through General Raeder’s recommendation of Dönitz to become his successor. He became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy after being appointed by Hitler on the 30th January 1943. Hitler realised that submarine warfare was an intrinsic element essential to Germany’s naval warfare which became ever so respected and consulted on a regular basis with meetings between Hitler and Dönitz. After the outbreak of war, they both conferred on the problematic issues dealing with the navy almost 120 times during the course of the war.

During his indictment at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, he confessed that he knew the struggle against the Allied forces was hopeless in April 1945. He did however, as Commander-in-Chief, urge the Navy to prolong the fight and continue the struggle of war. When he assumed the role as Head of State on the 1st May 1945, he ordered the Wehrmacht to continue its war in the East until the capitulation of Germany on the 9th May 1945. In the trial of the major war criminals, Dönitz explained his reasoning behind ensuing such orders to ensure that the German civilian population could be evacuated and the Wehrmacht forces to retreat from the East. In the case of the Tribunal, the evidence provided states that Dönitz was active in waging unrestricted aggressive warfare.

War Crimes

The international war crimes tribunal at Nuremberg charged Admiral Dönitz of waging unrestricted submarine warfare according to the Naval Protocol of 1936 which Germany endorsed and reasserted the rules of subsequent submarine warfare activity established in the London Naval Agreement of 1930. They dubbed that Dönitz waged aggressive warlike manoeuvres to instrument suffering against the Allied powers. They found that Dönitz disregarded the Protocol by waging arms of submarine warfare with German U-Boats against merchant ships whether neutral or enemy vessels. They deemed that all efforts throughout the process of war were made to disguise the practice of unrestricted submarine warfare. By making insincere references to international law and highlighting supposed violations performed by the Allies. Dönitz stressed that the Navy acted within the confines of the international law and Protocol regarding the activity of navy vessels. He testified that when war broke out, the instructions to submarine warfare was the German Prize Ordinance which was drawn literally from the Protocol. Moreover, compatible to the German view of submarine warfare, he ordered subsequently German submarines to attack merchant vessels in convoy. This also applied to all vessels that refused to halt their activity. Dönitz’s reports indicated that British merchant vessels were used to attacking submarines on sight, were heavily armed and gave information subsequently through wireless means. On the basis of his reports, he ordered that resistance against the enemy must be applied by attacking all enemy merchant vessels without warning which he ordered in October 1939.

The German Government in late November of 1939 issued a warning to neutral ships that their safety amongst the sea could no longer be taken for granted as the Allies had previously instructed their submarines to ram German U-Boots along the British Isles and French Coast. Engagements frequently took place between the German U-Boats and Allied merchant ships but acting on the orders conveyed by Hitler, the U-Boat command was instructed to attack all Greek merchant ships encircling the zone neighbouring the British Isles. Which was also prohibited by the United States who limited the activity of their own seafaring vessels of the Bristol Channel. In the North Sea area, the U-Boat command was advised to make unrestricted use of weapons against all ships. This order was subsequently found by the international war crimes tribunal as an unnecessary measure which waged war against all vessels whether neutral or Allied. These commands ultimately led to the order of all German U-Boats authorised to sink all ships without warning under the direct orders of Hitler . Dönitz was therefore acting on the authorisation of the upper echelon of the Party although exceptions were made when it came to waging conflict amongst Soviet. Italian, Japanese and United States ships. Following the outbreak of war, the British Admiralty, in conformity with Merchant Navy regarding the Handbook of Instructions of 1938, equipped its merchant ships and in many instances convoyed them with armed escorts. They also provided location information upon sighting submarines which assimilated measure their warning network of naval intelligence. The British equally waged war against the German U-Boots when their Admiralty announced in October 1939 that all British merchant ships should ram German U-Boats if possible. The Tribunal due to the circumstances regarding Dönitz’s testimony could not hold him guilty for his conduct at sea regarding submarine warfare against British armed merchant vessels as they were also willing to wage conflict against German U-Boots.

The possibility of neutral merchants being ordered to be sunk upon entering operational zones raises a different question among his conduct at sea. During World War I, the tactics and practice of sinking vessels in operational zones were adopted by the British and employed as a form of retaliation against Germany. The Protocol of 1936 made no exceptions for operational zones despite the knowledge obtained during the First World War. The tribunal judged that the command of Dönitz to attack and sink neutral ships without any warning was a violation of the war Protocol. Therefore, the evidence state proves that he should be punished and found he was liable for his actions. Dönitz’s crimes were not assessed on the grounds of his war breaches of the international law of submarine warfare but on an agenda by the Allies to sentence every Nazi to the death penalty or imprisonment. He was judged unfairly on the indictments brought against him as Admiral Nimitz stated in his interrogating process that the United States involvement in unrestricted submarine warfare on the Pacific Ocean from the outset of their nation entering the war. The British Admiralty announced that all vessels should be sunk at first sight in the Skagerrak on the 8th May 1940.

The international war crimes tribunal charged Dönitz with the responsibility of having known about Hitler’s Commando Order which he received on the 18th October 1942. The Commando Order was issued by the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) stating that all Allied commandos should be directly killed without trial, whether in official uniforms or in the case of attempted surrender upon encountering in Europe or Africa. While he served as Flag Officer for the U-Boots, he admitted he knew of the order but disclaimed and disassociated himself with all subsequent responsibility for the actions of Hitler. He expressed that the navy had no territorial commands on land and that all men captured during naval warfare were excluded by the terms provided under Hitler’s command. Submarine commanders would never encounter with commandos. While he assumed the role as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy in 1943, an instance occurred where the crew of an allied motor torpedo boat were apprehended by the German Navy Force. And from then interrogated for the intelligence purposes on behalf of the acting local admiral of the U-Boat. Once interrogation means were concluded they were turned over to the Sicherheitsdienst and ordered to be executed. Dönitz argued that if an allied member was executed on behalf of his Navy, then it was a violation of the commando order. He emphasised he had never been notified by the Wehrmacht in the case of an allied execution, thus relinquishing any responsibility that may come his way. Dönitz denied any knowledge that he had been informed about such an incident. The admiral in question was not under his chain of command which relinquished any responsibility that Dönitz had prior knowledge to the event but was subordinate to the army general in charge of operations of the Nazi occupation of Norway. While denying he was responsible for the commander, Dönitz authorized the order to remain in full force when he became Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy and to that extent is seen as responsible for the actions of one of his admirals.

Dönitz’s position was well recognised by Hitler in so that he was frequently consulted along with Jodl on whether the Geneva Convention should be denounced in 1945. Dönitz expressed that the disadvantages of action outweighed the advantages in his notes. He was therefore seen as an active member in consulting Hitler on major political and wartime issues. For his involvement in unrestricted submarine warfare, he was therefore punished by the tribunal as associated in waging war against the allies and neutral vessels.

Verdict

While Dönitz was investigated on three separate counts of crimes against war, he was only found guilty on counts (2) and (3) and not guilty on count (1) of the indictment. For his involvement in the National Socialist Regime, and conspiracy to wage unrestricted submarine warfare at sea, he was charged and sentenced to ten years of imprisonment in Spandau Prison. Following his release from Spandau, he settled in a small village near Hamburg until his death in 1980. Dönitz’s legacy as the only head of state to be convicted by an international war crimes tribunal bypassed for nearly 70 years until the conviction of Liberia’s Charles Taylor in 2012.

The verdict was considered by many as a disgraceful performance of injustice displayed within the International Military Tribunal. Navy officers on the Allied side regarded the verdict as an insufficient condemnation against one of their fellow naval brothers. His imprisonment followed an onslaught of letters addressed to Dönitz from admirals, generals and historians displaying their sincere outrage and regret towards for his fate.

How did Dönitz view the legitimacy of the trial?

Dönitz maintained that his arrest and conviction was purely political but recognised that if the roles were reversed that Germany would have done the same. The lack of evidence damning Dönitz is therefore why he was not sentenced to death. Dönitz laughable to try a head of state for war crimes, characterising his sentence and the legitimacy of the trial as a ‘mockery of justice’ in Speer’s Spandau Diaries. Furthermore, he declared that he had no knowledge of the treatment of Jews and that his service within the Kriegsmarine committed no crimes against humanity. The trial in Dönitz’s view was a ridiculous display of hypocrisy displayed by the Allied powers to unmeasurably justify the imprisonment of a head of state.

The reasoning behind why Admiral Dönitz was convicted and condemned as a war criminal can perhaps be interpreted through the Allies refusal to relinquish the last head of German state to freedom. The prospect of Dönitz exiting the courtroom a free man would have served as an embarrassing outcome to the Allies who sought to sentence him to 10 years imprisonment, to therefore justify potential further political considerations with Germany. Dönitz then went on to say, “I accept responsibility for U-boat warfare from 1933 onward, and of the entire navy from 1943 on, but to make me responsible for what happened to Jews in Germany, or Russian soldiers on the east front… it is so ridiculous all I can do is laugh.” This statement made by him, shows his willingness to accept responsibility for the activities of the Kriegsmarine but disclaims his involvement regarding the persecution of the European Jewry.

“The trial can only end in a mistake because it is founded on one. How can a foreign court try a sovereign government of another country? Could we have tried your President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Secretary Henry Morgenthau, or Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden, if we had won the war? We could not have done so and would not have. The trying that went on would have to be done by the nation itself and the courts set up there.”

It was disputed that the international war crimes tribunal broke every standard to sentencing Dönitz for crimes against the unrestricted use submarine warfare. His orders were similar to the actions performed by the Allied forces which the international tribunal overlooked and subsequently persecuted Dönitz for his navy warfare orders. Many historians debated that he was doing his devout duty to his country regardless of Nazism, which portrayed him as a hero to the German people.

Conclusion

We can conclude our argument to state while Dönitz was a professional and a devout servant of the National Socialist Regime that the war crimes tribunal were unjust and unfair in their judgement of sentencing Dönitz for the indictments that were brought against him. Every naval commander during the war whether Allied or enemy waged unrestricted warfare against enemy or neutral vessels which can be compared through orders carried out by the British Admiralty. However, his trial at the International Military Tribunal will be remembered for certain hypocrisy. All sides participated in unrestricted submarine warfare, it was rather hypocritical to call that a crime in the circumstances and charge him. His Allied counterparts would have performed the same procedures if faced with the situation Dönitz was in. The fact that Dönitz was head of state perhaps was another reason why he should be persecuted for the crimes of Nazism. As chief of the German submarine fleet, he earned Allied respect as a formidable enemy. But after he succeeded Adolf Hitler as Führer, his name became associated with all the most hated ideologies and members within the Nazi Regime. Furthermore, while he was not tried for being an anti-Semite, his writings and address to the German nation provide a clear image of his beliefs. Dönitz never really revised his view on his relationship with Hitler and therefore Hitler was still his commander-in-chief until his death in 1980. If you ask why he was chosen as successor, then another question must be referred to, who was there? Himmler, Göring, Goebbels, Bormann, they were all reduced to fragmented figures within the Nazi Party. These factors led Hitler to determine that Dönitz status as Großadmiral left him as the obvious choice of succession. While serving as Führer for a mere 23 days, he ensured the safety of many German Wehrmacht soldiers from being captured at the hands of the Soviet troops. He deemed the war as a fight against Bolshevism and the European Jewry who seek to denounce Nazism and a new order as Dönitz described. Dönitz tenure as head of state will be substantially remembered and deserves credit for his involvement in saving nearly 2 million refugees and signing the unconditional surrender of the German Reich.

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